Openalias Resolver Security Measures
Have you used openalias-resolver.org yet? If not, first read about OpenAlias here and here. Openalias-resolver.org is my web app for translating OpenAlias addresses, and also helping you to make your own one. It's useful because of many features...
- ... wide range of cryptocurrencies;
- ... formats the DNS TXT record for you, if you need it, thus avoiding typos;
- ... uses DNSSEC to prove that the user's address is the genuine one;
- ... uses a mix of DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH);
- ... allows use of a personal DNS server;
- ... and more...
Openalias-resolver.org has been designed for excellent privacy and safety. In this post, I will go over these privacy- and safety-enhancing measures.
What happens behind the scenes
- The user enters the OpenAlias address and chooses the right cryptocurrency on the webpage.
- The web browser first tries DNS over TLS. Then, if needed, it tries DNS over HTTPS (at step 5-6)
- The DNS over TLS query is sent as Websocket JSON data over TCP port 443 to a randomly chosen proxy server from a list.
- The proxy server changes the websocket request to DNS over TLS and sends it to one of two DNS servers, either Quad9 or Cloudflare.
- If that fails, the web browser makes a direct connection to Quad9 with DNS over HTTPS (TCP port 443).
- If that fails, the web browser makes a direct connection to Cloudflare with DNS over HTTPS (TCP port 443).
- The DNS server checks whether the domain in the OpenAlias record has DNSSEC.
- If no DNSSEC, the user is warned.
- The user can enter in a custom DNS server for all these steps.
- The user can enter in a custom DNS server and bypass the proxy server in steps 2-4.
- The user-chosen DNS server can only be accessed via a password; this password is saved on the local device in encrypted form.
- There is no unencrypted data transfer.